After Eisenhower's fiat for the operation there was plenty of work to do. All kinds of preparations had to be made because within a week this gigantic operation had to start. The drop zones near Arnhem, Groesbeek and the area between the Maas and the Waal already had been photographed during reconnaissance flights intended for Operation Comet, a British proposition to bring the airborne troops into action. Since they were familiar with Arnhem and surroundings because of their Operation Comet studies, this probably was the reason the British 1st Airborne Division was chosen to secure the Arnhem sector. Urquhart, fearing German guns near the bridge, chose the landing and drop zones near Wolfheze, Renkum and Heelsum. These zones were rather remote from their main target, Arnhem bridge. But even if there weren't any German guns, the ground near the bridge was unsuitable for landing. Strangely, this area was selected as a drop zone for the Polish troops.

The U.S. 101st Airborne Division was to land in the Eindhoven-sector. They got this area because the division was stationed in South England. This meant they could be flown to their destination without crossing the flight routes of other airborne troops. The only sector left was Nijmegen. So this sector was allocated to the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. 35,000 men and equipment, such as jeeps and guns, had to be transported to these areas. Furthermore, they had to be protected and resupplied. An operation like this had never been done before. The first problem was transportation. Around 2,500 gliders were available for transporting men and equipment. One third of the 35,000 men was going to be transported by gliders, while the other two thirds used troop carrier planes and had to parachute at the chosen drop zones. It was clear from the beginning that such a large number of men could not be brought to their targets in just one day. Only one airlift per day was feasible. It would take 2 or 3 days to bring all the men and their equipment to their destinations. This would reduce the surprise effect, but there was no other choice. It had to be decided what had to go first.

Since Taylor's Division had to link up with the British XXX Corps as soon as possible, they needed more men than equipment on the first day. Gavin's men, on the other hand, had to secure the Groesbeek Heights and the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen. Because of this 'extra assignment' artillery had to be brought in for them on the first day. And since the British had to hold their positions for the longest time before XXX Corps arrived, they got more men on the first day than the other two divisions.

The airborne invasion had to take place in daylight to increase the accuracy of the landings and to ensure quick grouping. Besides, the Luftwaffe (German air force) was practically absent in Western airspace. Still, it wasn't without risk. Approximately 1,500 fighter planes (British Spitfires, Typhoons, Tempests, Mosquitos and American Thunderbolts, Lightnings and Mustangs) had to hit German anti-aircraft guns before the first airlift could pass, and they had to escort the whole armada along the route. Rescue ships in the North Sea were to go into action if an aircraft went down and they also functioned as 'signposts' for the passing planes.
Almost everybody thought that this battle was going to be a "piece of cake". Nothing would stand in their way. You could also say nothing was allowed to stand in the way. Finally the airborne troops would be a part of the war again! They were fed up with all the cancelled operations. This time it was for real and nothing could stop it. This frame of mind probably was the reason that Dutch Resistance reports of the presence of Panzer units in Arnhem (later confirmed by reconnaissance photos) were totally ignored by the British.

On September 16th, "Operation Market Garden" was confirmed. It would start on September 17th, 1944.

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